When Two Words Change Everything: How the Standard Fire Policy Turns Denials Into Coverage

You receive a denial letter from your insurance company. The language seems clear. The exclusion seems to apply. But what if the policy your insurer wrote doesn't actually have the last word?

In roughly 30 states, it doesn't. These states have adopted what's known as the Standard Fire Policy — a statutory form originally prescribed by New York in 1943 and sometimes called the "165-line policy." The Standard Fire Policy functions as a regulatory floor: insurance companies can offer more coverage than the Standard Fire Policy provides, but they cannot offer less. When the actual language in your policy deviates from the Standard Fire Policy in a way that is less favorable to you, the Standard Fire Policy language controls — and the insurer's version is void and unenforceable.

What makes this particularly fascinating — and potentially case-changing — is that the deviations are often subtle. A single word. A slight rewording. The drafters of either the actual policy or the Standard Fire Policy may not have fully anticipated how small differences in phrasing could produce dramatically different outcomes when applied to real-world claims. But courts have noticed, and the results have been striking.

The Principle: A Floor, Not a Ceiling

The legal framework is straightforward. In states that have adopted the Standard Fire Policy, its provisions are deemed to be "read into" every fire insurance policy issued in the state, regardless of what the actual policy says. If a court determines that a provision in the insurer's policy provides less coverage than the corresponding provision in the Standard Fire Policy, the court will reform the policy — striking the insurer's language and replacing it with the statutory standard.

This isn't a matter of ambiguity or interpretation. It's statutory mandate. The insurer's actual policy is measured against the standard, and where the actual policy falls short, the standard prevails.

Why Fire? Understanding the Standard Fire Policy's Unique Role

Readers may notice that the cases discussed in this article overwhelmingly involve fire losses. That is not a coincidence — it goes to the heart of what the Standard Fire Policy is and how it operates.

A modern homeowner's insurance policy covers many different perils: fire, windstorm, hail, theft, water damage, vandalism, and others. For most of these perils, the insurer has broad discretion to draft the policy language however it chooses. The insurer can add exclusions, impose conditions, limit coverage, or restructure the terms in ways that are less favorable to the policyholder, and those provisions will generally be enforceable — subject only to ordinary principles of contract interpretation and state insurance regulations.

Fire is different. In the roughly 30 states that have adopted the Standard Fire Policy, fire coverage is governed by statute. The legislature has prescribed specific language — the 165-line Standard Fire Policy — that defines the minimum terms under which fire losses must be covered. An insurer can offer more generous fire coverage than the Standard Fire Policy provides, but it cannot offer less. Any provision in the actual policy that restricts fire coverage below the statutory floor is void and unenforceable, regardless of how clearly it is written.

This means that for perils like water damage, mold, or earth movement, an insurer's exclusions and limitations generally stand as written. But for fire, every exclusion, every condition, and every procedural requirement in the actual policy must be measured against the Standard Fire Policy. If the actual policy is more restrictive than the standard, the standard controls.

This is why the Standard Fire Policy has become such a powerful tool for policyholders and their attorneys. It provides a second line of analysis — a statutory backstop — that applies specifically and exclusively to fire losses. A claim that appears to be properly denied under the actual policy may nonetheless be covered when the Standard Fire Policy is brought into the picture, because the exclusion or condition the insurer relied on falls below the statutory floor.

The Standard Fire Policy does not help with a denied water damage claim or a disputed theft loss. But for fire — the peril that has been at the center of property insurance since its inception — it provides a level of statutory protection that no other peril enjoys.

"The Insured" vs. "An Insured": Two Words, Two Very Different Outcomes

The most consequential — and most frequently litigated — deviation involves just two words.

The Standard Fire Policy uses the phrase "the insured"throughout its concealment, fraud, and hazard provisions. This creates what courts call a "several" or "independent" obligation. Each insured is evaluated individually. If one insured commits fraud or an intentional act, only that insured's coverage is affected. The other insureds on the policy — the innocent ones — retain their right to recover.

Most modern homeowner's policies, however, use the phrase "an insured" or "any insured."This seemingly minor substitution creates a joint obligation: if any one insured commits a wrongful act, every insured on the policy loses coverage — including those who had nothing to do with it.

The difference between "the" and "an" might seem trivial on a drafting table. In a courtroom, it can mean the difference between a family losing everything and recovering hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Streit v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. (7th Cir. 2017)

Barbara and Wesley Streit's 19-year-old son suffered from serious psychological disturbances. He set fire to the family home and was convicted of aggravated arson, pleading guilty but mentally ill, and was sentenced to six years in prison.

Metropolitan denied the parents' claim entirely. The policy excluded coverage for any loss "arising out of any intentional or criminal act" committed by anyone defined as "you or your" — and the policy defined "you/your" to include relatives who are residents of the household. Under a strict reading of Metropolitan's actual policy language, the parents had no claim.

The parents' attorney raised the Illinois Standard Fire Policy, which is identical to the 1943 New York form. The Standard Fire Policy does not contain a blanket intentional-acts exclusion. Its concealment and hazard provisions refer only to "the insured"— the specific individual who committed the act. The parents had done nothing wrong.

The Seventh Circuit agreed. Metropolitan's intentional-acts exclusion conflicted with the Illinois Standard Fire Policy because it barred innocent co-insureds from recovery. The exclusion was void.

The Streits recovered $235,000. Under the actual policy language alone, they would have recovered nothing.

863 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2017). Read the opinion on Justia.

Century-National Insurance Co. v. Garcia (Cal. 2011)

Jesus Garcia Sr. and his wife Theodora suffered substantial damage to their home when their adult son — also an insured under the policy — intentionally set fire to his bedroom. Century-National denied coverage based on exclusions for intentional loss and criminal conduct applying to "any insured."

The California Supreme Court held that the intentional-acts exclusion impermissibly reduced coverage below what is statutorily mandated under California's Standard Fire Policy (California Insurance Code Sections 2070-2071). The Standard Fire Policy's consistent use of "the insured" creates several obligations — one insured's wrongful acts defeat only that insured's rights, not those of innocent co-insureds. The exclusion was declared invalid as applied to the innocent parents.

The Garcias recovered.

51 Cal.4th 564, 246 P.3d 621 (2011). Read the opinion on FindLaw.

Lane v. Security Mutual Insurance Co. (N.Y. 2001)

A mother's 17-year-old son deliberately set fire to the insured home. Security Mutual denied the mother's claim based on an exclusion for intentional acts by "an insured."

The New York Court of Appeals — the state's highest court, and the state where the Standard Fire Policy originated — ruled that the "an insured" language provided "significantly less coverage" than the Standard Fire Policy's "the insured" language, in violation of New York Insurance Law Section 3404. The policy was reformed to conform to the standard.

The innocent mother was entitled to coverage.

96 N.Y.2d 1, 747 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 2001).

Watson v. United Services Automobile Association (Minn. 1997)

Elizabeth Watson's estranged husband Keith intentionally set fire to their mobile home. A jury found he acted willfully and with intent to defraud. USAA denied Elizabeth's claim based on the policy's intentional-loss exclusion, which used the phrase "an insured."

The Minnesota Supreme Court reformed the USAA policy to conform with the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy (Minn. Stat. Section 65A.01). The statutory standard uses "the insured," which the court interpreted as excluding coverage only for the particular insured who intentionally caused the loss — not an innocent co-insured. Elizabeth Watson was entitled to recover her proportionate share of the loss.

566 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1997). Read the opinion on Justia.

Osbon v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. (La. 1994)

Pauline Osbon's home was destroyed by a fire intentionally set by her husband James on February 15, 1990. National Union denied her claim.

The Louisiana Supreme Court held that National Union failed to provide coverage in conformity with or in excess of the Standard Fire Policy form (La. R.S. 22:691). The court reformed the policy. Under the Standard Fire Policy, Pauline as an innocent insured was not barred from recovery by her husband's conduct. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Pauline for $32,000 for the dwelling and $6,400 for loss of use.

632 So.2d 1158 (La. 1994). Read the opinion on Justia.

Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dean (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)

This case involved facts that were tragic in every sense. One co-insured murdered the other co-insured and then set fire to the home. Fireman's Fund denied the claim brought by the murdered co-insured's estate, citing a policy provision that voided coverage if "an insured" concealed material facts or committed fraud.

The Georgia Court of Appeals held that while the policy language was unambiguous, it violated Georgia Code Section 33-32-1, which requires fire insurance to be "as favorable to the insured as the language in the Standard Fire Policy." The court reformed the policy, replacing "an insured" with "the insured."

The innocent co-insured's estate recovered.

212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).

Borman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (Mich. 1994)

An innocent co-insured sought coverage after a fire. State Farm's policy denied recovery if "any insured" committed concealment or misrepresentation.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that State Farm's use of "any insured" was inconsistent with the Michigan Standard Fire Policy, which used "the insured." Provisions denying coverage to an innocent insured because of another insured's wrongdoing were void.

The court ruled that State Farm was liable to the innocent insured "in the same manner and to the same extent as if the inconsistent provisions were not contained in the policy."

446 Mich. 482, 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994).

Aquino v. United Property & Casualty Co. (Mass. 2020)

Wenda Aquino and her fiance, Kelly Pastrana, were co-insureds on a homeowner's policy. Pastrana intentionally set fire to the home. United Property denied the entire claim based on its intentional-loss exclusion barring recovery by "any insured."

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Standard Fire Policy set by Massachusetts statute (G.L. c. 175, Section 99) "imposes several, rather than joint, rights and obligations on insureds." United Property's redrafting of the statutory language to make either insured responsible for the other's actions violated the statute. The policy was reformed.

Aquino recovered her one-half interest under the policy.

483 Mass. 820 (2020). Read the opinion on Justia.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez (Mass. Super. 2017)

Somaly Yet started a fire in a home she jointly owned with Joel Gonzalez. Both were named insureds under a Liberty Mutual homeowner's policy. Yet intentionally set the fire after Gonzalez ended their relationship. She pled guilty to arson. Liberty Mutual denied Gonzalez's claim based on an intentional-loss exclusion barring coverage for acts by "an insured."

The court granted summary judgment for Gonzalez, finding that Liberty Mutual's intentional-loss exclusion conflicted with the minimum protections of the Massachusetts Standard Fire Policy. The Standard Fire Policy's "the insured" creates several obligations — the arsonist's conduct voided only the arsonist's rights, not those of the innocent co-insured.

2017 WL 3080565 (Mass. Super. 2017). Read analysis on Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog.

Icenhour v. Continental Insurance Co. (S.D. W. Va. 2004)

Nadine Icenhour left for an overnight trip after her husband threatened to burn their family home. While he was under a domestic violence protection order and not residing in the home, the home was destroyed by arson. Continental denied coverage based on the intentional-acts exclusion.

The court held that the policy's intentional-acts exclusion provided insureds less protection than the terms of the West Virginia Standard Fire Policy (W. Va. Code Section 33-17-2, which mandates conformity with the 1943 New York Standard Fire Policy). The exclusion was void by operation of law. The innocent co-insured was entitled to recover.

365 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). Read the opinion on Justia.

Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Kirsling (Idaho 2003)

In an arson case, the insurer sought to deny coverage to all insureds based on an intentional-acts exclusion. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the insurance policy conflicted with Idaho's standard statutory fire policy (Idaho Code Section 41-2401) and provided less coverage than required by statute. The court allowed recovery for the innocent co-insured because the exclusion violated the Standard Fire Policy's minimum protections.

139 Idaho 89, 73 P.3d 102 (Idaho 2003). Discussed in United Policyholders, "Holding the Line."

Nangle v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona (Ariz. App. 2003)

Arizona's Standard Fire Policy (A.R.S. Section 20-1503) was held to protect innocent co-insureds. The court found that the insurer's "any insured" exclusion language conflicted with the Standard Fire Policy's "the insured" language, preventing the exclusion from barring recovery by an innocent co-insured.

205 Ariz. 517, 73 P.3d 1252 (Ariz. App. 2003). Read the opinion on FindLaw.

Sager v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (Iowa 2004)

Robert Sager intentionally set fire to the basement of the home he shared with his wife Ramona. Farm Bureau denied Ramona's claim based on the "intentional loss" exclusion.

The Iowa courts concluded that the "intentional loss" exclusion violated the minimum protections afforded by Iowa's Standard Fire Policy (Iowa Code Section 515.138) and was unenforceable. The court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Ramona.

680 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2004). Read the opinion on FindLaw.

Courts in at least thirteen states — Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, and West Virginia — have now reached the same conclusion: when the actual policy uses "an insured" or "any insured" where the Standard Fire Policy uses "the insured," the Standard Fire Policy controls.

Beyond "The" vs. "An": Other Deviations That Change Outcomes

The innocent co-insured cases are the most dramatic examples, but they are far from the only ones. Courts have identified deviations across multiple categories of policy provisions — each one capable of turning a denial into coverage.

Vacancy Provisions

The Standard Fire Policy suspends coverage if the property "has been vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty consecutive days." Courts have interpreted this as measuring the 60-day period prospectively from the inception of coverage — not backward from the date of loss. The Standard Fire Policy also sets sixty days as the minimum; insurers cannot shorten this period.

Ervin v. Travelers Personal Insurance Co. (N.D. Ill. 2018): A fire damaged a two-unit residential property 32 days after the policy went into effect. The building had been vacant for more than two years before the policyholder purchased it. Travelers denied the claim under a vandalism exclusion, counting vacancy backward from the date of loss.

The court held that Travelers' approach was "inconsistent and in conflict with the Standard Fire Policy vacancy condition." The Standard Fire Policy measures vacancy prospectively from the date of inception. Because the fire occurred only 32 days after inception, the 60-day period had not expired.

Travelers owed coverage.

No. 17-5492, 2018 WL 1635849 (N.D. Ill. 2018).

Lundquist v. Allstate Insurance Co. (Ill. App. 2000):Allstate's policy excluded fire losses if a building was vacant or unoccupied for just 30 consecutive days — half the period permitted under the Standard Fire Policy. The court held that because "insurance policies may not provide less coverage than that set forth in the Standard Policy," Allstate's 30-day vacancy provision was void. The Standard Fire Policy's 60-day standard controlled.

314 Ill. App. 3d 240, 732 N.E.2d 627 (2d Dist. 2000).

Residence Restrictions

The Standard Fire Policy does not require the named insured to personally reside at the insured property as a condition of coverage. Some insurers add this requirement — and courts across multiple states have struck it down.

Henrich v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. (S.D. Iowa):Auto-Owners denied a fire claim because the named insured did not personally reside at the insured dwelling — the insured's son lived there instead. The policy contained a "residence restriction" requiring the named insured to occupy the premises.

The court found the residence restriction violated the Iowa Standard Fire Policy. The Standard Fire Policy's vacancy provision only precludes coverage after 60 consecutive days of vacancy — the residence restriction was far broader because it barred coverage even when the property was occupied. The restriction "impermissibly broadened the standard form's exclusions."

The residence restriction was declared unenforceable. Coverage was required.

FBS Mortgage Corp. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (N.D. Ill. 1993):State Farm's policy contained a residence restriction requiring the named insured to reside at the insured dwelling. The insured did not reside at the property. The court found the residence restriction unenforceable because it was not the substantial equivalent of the Standard Fire Policy's vacancy and increased hazard provisions, which only trigger after 60 or more days of vacancy. The Standard Fire Policy set a floor that the residence restriction fell below.

833 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

Dixon v. First Premium Insurance Group (La. App. 2006):Louisiana court found residence restrictions unenforceable against the Standard Fire Policy minimums. The insurer's residence requirement was struck down because the Standard Fire Policy's vacancy provision — not a residence requirement — is the applicable standard.

934 So.2d 134 (La. App. 2006).

Shank v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America (S.D. W. Va. 2016):Safeco's policy contained a residence restriction in West Virginia. The court held the restriction unenforceable under West Virginia's statutory standard fire form requirements.

2016 WL 453028 (S.D. W. Va. 2016).

Protective Safeguard Endorsements

The Standard Fire Policy does not condition fire coverage on maintaining protective devices such as smoke detectors, sprinklers, or fire alarms.

Jin Zun Zou v. American Modern Home Insurance Co. (D. Minn.): An accidental fire started in a residence in St. Paul. The insurer denied coverage under a Protective Safeguards Endorsement because three non-working smoke alarms were found in a closet and the insured had not notified the insurer of their removal.

The court held the endorsement was contrary to the Minnesota Standard Fire Policy. The Standard Fire Policy does not condition fire coverage on maintaining protective devices, nor does it exclude coverage for failure to maintain them.

The protective safeguards exclusion was voided. Coverage was granted.

Smoke Damage Definitions

As the old saying goes: where there's smoke, there's fire. Courts have taken that relationship seriously. Smoke is a direct and inevitable byproduct of fire, and the Standard Fire Policy covers "all loss by fire." Because smoke damage is inseparable from fire, the Standard Fire Policy's protections extend to smoke losses just as they do to fire losses. An insurer cannot restrict smoke coverage any more than it can restrict fire coverage — and when it tries, the Standard Fire Policy controls.

Alif v. California FAIR Plan Association (L.A. Superior Court, 2025):A cabin near Lake Tahoe was damaged by smoke during the 2020 Mountain View Fire. The California FAIR Plan's policy defined "direct physical loss" from smoke as requiring "permanent physical damages or changes" visible to the "unaided human eye" or detectable by the "unaided human nose," and excluded laboratory testing as evidence.

The court ruled these restrictions were unlawful under California Insurance Code Sections 2070 and 2071, which codify the California Standard Fire Policy. The Standard Fire Policy covers "all loss by fire" without restrictive definitions requiring naked-eye visibility. Because smoke is a product of fire, the FAIR Plan could not impose restrictive definitions on smoke damage that would not be permissible for fire damage itself. Property damage "need not be visible to the naked eye" — alterations at the microscopic level can meet the threshold.

The FAIR Plan's restrictive definitions were invalidated. The insurer's attempt to narrow the definition of smoke damage was, in effect, an attempt to narrow fire coverage — and the Standard Fire Policy does not permit that.

Case No. 21STCV20095 (L.A. Super. Ct. 2025). Read analysis at Almeida Law Group.

Replacement Cost Time Limits

Chaney v. Allstate Indemnity Co. (Ill. App. 2017):Allstate's policy required the insured to repair, replace, or rebuild the dwelling within 180 days of receiving the actual cash value payment in order to recover replacement cost benefits. The insured missed the deadline.

The Illinois appellate court held that the 180-day deadline violated the Standard Fire Policy. The Standard Fire Policy's insuring agreement permits recovery of replacement cost "within a reasonable time after such loss," which supersedes Allstate's more restrictive 180-day window. An artificial deadline reduced coverage below the statutory minimum.

The insured recovered full replacement cost despite missing Allstate's deadline.

2017 IL App (1st) 161498-U. Read analysis on Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog.

Policy Exclusions Not Found in the Standard Fire Policy

Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. (Cal. 2005):The California Supreme Court established that "policy exclusions are unenforceable to the extent they conflict with the Insurance Code" — specifically, the statutory Standard Fire Policy. This means exclusions that insurers add to their policies for wear and tear, mechanical breakdown, or other causes are unenforceable when applied to fire losses if the Standard Fire Policy does not contain those exclusions.

This is a broad and powerful principle: for fire losses, the only exclusions that are enforceable are those found in, or consistent with, the Standard Fire Policy itself.

35 Cal.4th 747, 110 P.3d 903 (2005).

Terrorism and Fire-Following Exclusions

The New York Department of Financial Services has opined that terrorism exclusions in fire policies violate the Standard Fire Policy because the Standard Fire Policy "does not permit the application of exclusions or limitations based upon the cause of the fire." The Standard Fire Policy covers fire losses irrespective of what caused the fire to start, with only narrow exceptions such as war.

This principle — that the cause of the fire is irrelevant to coverage — has been applied or recognized in at least 16 states, including California, Illinois, and New York. An insurer cannot exclude fire coverage based on the event that triggered the fire.

Nine Out of Ten: The Appraisal Case

One of the most striking recent examples involves not the question of whether a claim is covered, but the process for resolving how much should be paid.

Hart v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (E.D. Mich. 2021):After a fire loss, State Farm accepted liability but disputed the amount owed. The Harts had claimed losses over $286,000; State Farm had paid only $96,500. The Harts demanded appraisal — a process both parties are entitled to invoke when they disagree on the value of a loss.

But State Farm's policy (Form HW-2122) had layered extensive conditions onto the appraisal process: documentation requirements, procedural prerequisites, restrictions on what could be appraised, and qualifications not found anywhere in the Standard Fire Policy's straightforward appraisal provision.

The court compared State Farm's ten challenged provisions against the Michigan Standard Fire Policy's appraisal process and found that nine of the ten violated the statute.The provisions made appraisal "far more burdensome than the Michigan Legislature intended."

All nine provisions were declared void. The simple, straightforward appraisal process prescribed by the Standard Fire Policy controlled.

556 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Mich. 2021). Read analysis on Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog.

Why This Matters: A Practical Perspective

When a claim is denied, the natural instinct is to read the denial letter, read the policy, and conclude that the exclusion applies. The language seems clear. The insurer seems to have the stronger position.

But in roughly 30 states, the analysis doesn't end with the actual policy. There is another document — a statutory standard — that sits behind every fire insurance policy like a safety net. And because the Standard Fire Policy was written in 1943 using language that creates independent obligations and imposes fewer conditions than modern policies, it often provides broader coverage than what the insurer's own policy language would suggest.

The deviations are not always obvious. They may involve the substitution of a single article — "the" for "an." They may involve the addition of a condition that the Standard Fire Policy never contemplated. They may involve a procedural hurdle inserted into a process that the legislature intended to be simple.

These are the kinds of differences that can escape notice unless someone is specifically looking for them. They may have been introduced by policy drafters who were focused on other concerns, or who didn't anticipate how a slight rewording would interact with certain fact patterns. Whatever the reason, the deviations exist, and courts have consistently held that when they reduce coverage below the statutory minimum, the Standard Fire Policy prevails.

For anyone whose fire claim has been denied in a state that has adopted the Standard Fire Policy, the denial letter may not be the final answer. The actual policy language that seems to support the denial may itself be unenforceable — superseded by a statutory standard that the insurer's own policy is required to meet.

This Is Not the Only Way the Standard Fire Policy Protects You

This article has focused on one particular application of the Standard Fire Policy: its ability to turn a denial into coverage when the actual policy language deviates from the statutory standard in ways that are less favorable to the insured. But this is not the only way the Standard Fire Policy benefits policyholders.

The Standard Fire Policy also establishes baseline rights and procedures that protect insureds in other important ways. The appraisal provision discussed above is one example — the Standard Fire Policy's straightforward appraisal process can replace an insurer's burdensome version, making it far easier for an insured to invoke their right to an independent valuation of their loss. The Standard Fire Policy's proof-of-loss requirements, its limitations on when an insurer can void coverage, and its provisions governing how disputes are resolved all represent minimum protections that cannot be reduced by the insurer's own policy language.

The Standard Fire Policy is, in short, a document worth knowing about — whether you are a policyholder trying to understand your rights, or an attorney evaluating a claim that appears to have been properly denied.

States That Have Adopted the Standard Fire Policy

Courts have confirmed Standard Fire Policy protections in the following states (this list is not exhaustive):

Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin

Cases Cited

Innocent Co-Insured / "The Insured" vs. "An Insured":

• Streit v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co., 863 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2017) — Justia
• Century-National Insurance Co. v. Garcia, 51 Cal.4th 564, 246 P.3d 621 (Cal. 2011) — FindLaw
• Lane v. Security Mutual Insurance Co., 96 N.Y.2d 1, 747 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 2001)
• Watson v. United Services Automobile Association, 566 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1997) — Justia
• Osbon v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 632 So.2d 1158 (La. 1994) — Justia
• Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Dean, 212 Ga. App. 262, 441 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
• Borman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 446 Mich. 482, 521 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 1994)
• Aquino v. United Property & Casualty Co., 483 Mass. 820 (2020) — Justia
• Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez, 2017 WL 3080565 (Mass. Super. 2017) — Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog
• Icenhour v. Continental Insurance Co., 365 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) — Justia
• Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Kirsling, 139 Idaho 89, 73 P.3d 102 (Idaho 2003) — United Policyholders
• Nangle v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona, 205 Ariz. 517, 73 P.3d 1252 (Ariz. App. 2003) — FindLaw
• Sager v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 680 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2004) — FindLaw

Vacancy Provisions:

• Ervin v. Travelers Personal Insurance Co., No. 17-5492, 2018 WL 1635849 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
• Lundquist v. Allstate Insurance Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 240, 732 N.E.2d 627 (2d Dist. 2000)

Residence Restrictions:

• Henrich v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co. (S.D. Iowa)
• FBS Mortgage Corp. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 833 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
• Dixon v. First Premium Insurance Group, 934 So.2d 134 (La. App. 2006)
• Shank v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 2016 WL 453028 (S.D. W. Va. 2016)

Protective Safeguard Endorsements:

• Jin Zun Zou v. American Modern Home Insurance Co. (D. Minn.)

Smoke Damage Definitions:

• Alif v. California FAIR Plan Association, Case No. 21STCV20095 (L.A. Super. Ct. 2025) — Almeida Law Group

Replacement Cost Time Limits:

• Chaney v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161498-U — Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog

Policy Exclusions Conflicting with Standard Fire Policy:

• Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., 35 Cal.4th 747, 110 P.3d 903 (Cal. 2005)

Appraisal Provisions:

• Hart v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 556 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Mich. 2021) — Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog
• Haddock v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 638 F. Supp. 3d 748 (E.D. Mich. 2022)

Additional Resources

• United Policyholders, "Holding the Line: The Standard Fire Policy Remains a Useful Floor" (2022)
• Chip Merlin, Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog — multiple articles on Standard Fire Policy applications
• IDC Quarterly, "The Standard Fire Policy and the Innocent Insured," Vol. 29, No. 2
• Sloane and Walsh LLP, "We Didn't Start the Fire: Historical Analysis and Recent Developments Regarding the Innocent Co-Insured Doctrine"